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Abstract
We consider opacity questions where an observation function provides to an external attacker
a view of the states along executions and secret executions are those visiting some state from
a fixed subset. Disclosure occurs when the observer can deduce from a finite observation that
the execution is secret, the ε-disclosure variant corresponding to the execution being secret with
probability greater than 1−ε. In a probabilistic and non deterministic setting, where an internal
agent can choose between actions, there are two points of view, depending on the status of
this agent: the successive choices can either help the attacker trying to disclose the secret, if
the system has been corrupted, or they can prevent disclosure as much as possible if these
choices are part of the system design. In the former situation, corresponding to a worst case,
the disclosure value is the supremum over the strategies of the probability to disclose the secret
(maximisation), whereas in the latter case, the disclosure is the infimum (minimisation). We
address quantitative problems (comparing the optimal value with a threshold) and qualitative
ones (when the threshold is zero or one) related to both forms of disclosure for a fixed or finite
horizon. For all problems, we characterise their decidability status and their complexity. We
discover a surprising asymmetry: on the one hand optimal strategies may be chosen among
deterministic ones in maximisation problems, while it is not the case for minimisation. On the
other hand, for the questions addressed here, more minimisation problems than maximisation
ones are decidable.
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Keywords and phrases Partially observed systems – Opacity – Markov chain – Markov decision
process
Digital Object Identifier 10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTXS.2017.
1 Introduction
Opacity. Opacity of an information system is a key security property: an external user
should not, by observing an execution of a system, acquire the guarantee that it is a secret
one. This property was first formalised for labelled transition systems [9], by specifying
a subset of secret paths and requiring that, for any secret path, there is a non-secret one
with the same observation. The disclosure set of a system is then the set of (secret) paths
violating opacity.
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Opacity raises challenging research issues like (1) formal specification in various frame-
works [15, 9], (2) the design of mechanisms to ensure opacity while preserving functionality
and performance [2], and (3) the verification of opacity properties [16, 9].
Attacks against opacity. In order to quantify the size of the leak, various measures for
the disclosure set, called probabilistic disclosure, were introduced in [5, 19, 3, 6, 4]. For
probabilistic and non deterministic systems like Markov Decision Processes (MDP), where an
internal agent can choose between several actions, the disclosure can be either maximised or
minimised depending on the status of the agent. In previous works, the situation considered
corresponded to maximisation, where the system has been corrupted (e.g., by a virus), and
the internal agent cooperates with the attacker to disclose the secret. In [3], the set of secret
paths is specified by some deterministic automaton and the attacker does not know which
strategy is applied, hence the set of executions leaking the secret is fixed by the structure of
the system and does not vary according to the strategies. This is illustrated in Figure 1a with
an MDP where actions a and b are possible from state q0. Action a (resp. b) has a uniform
distribution over states q1 and q2 (resp. q3 and q4). States q1 and q3 produce observation
o1, while q2 and q4 produce o2. The secret paths are those in q0qω2 ∪ q0qω3 (reaching either
q2 or q3, in grey). If the observer is not aware of the strategy and thus has to consider all
possible paths whatever the strategy, the non secret paths are q0qω1 and q0qω4 , hence there is
no disclosing path, leading to a null disclosure (as in [3]). On the other hand, if the observer
is aware of the strategy, assuming that initially a is chosen produces a maximal disclosure
of 12 . This example also shows that deterministic strategies are not sufficient to achieve
minimisation: value 0 for the disclosure can only be obtained by randomised strategies,
choosing a with probability p and b with probability 1− p (for 0 < p < 1) in q0.
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Figure 1 When strategies help (or not) to disclose a secret.
In contrast, Figure 1b represents an MDP where both actions a and b have the same
support in state q0, hence choosing a or b does not change the states that can be reached.
Under a strategy which always plays a, the disclosure is equal to 23 which is the probability
of reaching q1.
Given some ε > 0, a path could alternatively be considered as disclosing the secret, if
the measure of the set of paths with same observation that are not secret is less than ε.
This notion is called ε-disclosure. For instance in Figure 1a with ε < 12 in order to achieve
a minimal ε-disclosure of 0 the strategy must select p between ε and 1 − ε. However in
Figure 1b for every ε > 0 the ε-disclosure is equal to 1 as the probability to be in a secret
state converges to 1 on every path.
This figure also illustrates the drastic restriction used in [4] where no edge in an MDP
can be blocked by a strategy. With this restricted power of the internal component, the
authors can assume that the observer knows the strategy, which is an important requirement
since the security of a system should not be based on hiding its design. The model used
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in [4] is in fact a restricted case of Interval Markov Decision Processes (IMDPs) so that after
some transformation, the problem boils down to IMDP model checking [12]. The general
decidability status of the disclosure problem is left open.
Contributions. Here we focus on several problems in MDPs under partial observation that
cannot be formalised as problems for classical POMDPs (Partially Observable MDPs). The
notion of disclosure is defined with respect to a fixed subset Sec of states: A (finite or infinite)
path is secret if it has visited some state of Sec. Other variants of secret path specifications
have been proposed with deterministic finite automata accepting finite or infinite paths. The
former case can be easily translated in our setting while we believe that the latter one is
debatable: a system is not really vulnerable if the attacker can only know the secret at
infinite horizon!
Once a strategy is fixed, the behaviour of the system is described by a possibly infinite
partially observable Markov chain, so we start in Section 2 by establishing several results on
the semantical aspects of disclosure in Markov chains. In addition, we prove undecidability
for the positive ε-disclosure problem (deciding if ε-disclosure is positive) within finite horizon.
We then consider two different settings depending on the status of the strategies. Like in
previous work, maximisation of disclosure corresponds to the internal agent cooperating with
the attacker to disclose a secret. Dually, minimisation is interesting to study during the
system design process, in order to optimise the choices of the internal agent to defend the
system. We address various problems in these settings, for a finite horizon but also for a fixed
horizon (given in unary representation), corresponding to real-time constraints requiring the
number of steps to be fixed in advance. The quantitative decision problem asks whether the
disclosure is above or below some threshold, while qualitative problems consider extremal
values (0 or 1) of the disclosure. We prove that observation-based strategies (i.e., which only
depend on the sequence of observations and the current state) are dominant in both cases.
The main complexity results for decision problems are gathered in Table 1. For the
maximisation objective (Section 3), we show that deterministic strategies are dominant. We
answer negatively to the decidability issues left open in [4], proving that both the quantitative
problem and the limit-sure problem (asking whether the supremum over all strategies is
1) are undecidable for a finite horizon. Then, we show that the almost-sure problem
(asking whether there is a strategy producing a value 1 for disclosure) is EXPTIME-complete.
For minimisation (Section 4), we introduce families of randomised strategies, necessary to
asymptotically reach minimal disclosure, even within fixed horizon. For finite horizon, we
show that the computation and decision problems belong to EXPTIME. Hence surprisingly,
although the problem seems more difficult due to the necessity of randomised strategies, the
disclosure problem for minimisation is decidable whereas it is not for maximisation. Section 5
is devoted to the fixed horizon problems. For maximisation, we prove that the disclosure value
can be computed in PSPACE (while its associated strategy can be computed in EXPTIME) and
also establish that the corresponding decision problem is PSPACE-complete. The almost-sure
and limit-sure decision problem however are easier and can be solved in PTIME. Refining the
techniques to take randomised strategies into account, we obtain PSPACE-completeness of
the various decision problems for minimisation. Most of the proofs are in appendix.
2 Specification
We denote by N the set of natural numbers. For a finite alphabet Σ, we denote by Σ∗ (resp.
Σω) the set of finite (resp. infinite) words over Σ, with Σ∞ = Σ∗ ∪Σω and ε the empty word.
The length of a word w is denoted by |w| ∈ N∪ {∞} and for n ∈ N, Σn is the set of words of
FSTTCS 2017
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Table 1 Complexity results for maximisation and minimisation of disclosure.
Disclosure General Limit-sure Almost-sure
Maximisation finite horizon undecidable undecidable EXPTIME-c
Minimisation finite horizon PSPACE-hard ≤ Min ≤ EXPTIME
Maximisation fixed horizon PSPACE-c. PTIME PTIME
Minimisation fixed horizon PSPACE-c PSPACE-c PSPACE-c
length n. A word u ∈ Σ∗ is a prefix of v ∈ Σ∞, written u ≤ v, if v = uw for some w ∈ Σ∞.
The prefix is strict if w 6= ε. Given a countable set Z, a distribution on Z is a mapping
µ : Z → [0, 1] such that
∑
z∈Z µ(z) = 1. The support of µ is Supp(µ) = {z ∈ Z | µ(z) > 0}.
If Supp(µ) = {z} is a single element, µ is a Dirac distribution on z written 1z. We denote
by Dist(S) the set of distributions on S.
2.1 Opacity for Markov chains
For the purpose of opacity questions, the models are equipped with a labelling function on
states, called observation function, describing what an external observer can see. We first
define observable Markov chains (MCs for short).
I Definition 1 (Markov chains). An observable Markov chain (MC) over alphabet Σ is a
tupleM = (S, p,O) where S is a countable set of states, p : S → Dist(S) is the transition
function, and O : S → Σ ∪ {ε} is the observation function.
We write p(s′|s) instead of p(s)(s′) to emphasise the probability of going to state s′ condi-
tionned by being in state s. Given a distribution µ0 on S, we denote byM(µ0) the chain with
initial distribution µ0. An infinite path ofM(µ0) is a sequence of states ρ = s0s1 . . . ∈ Sω
such that µ0(s0) > 0 and for each i ≥ 0, p(si+1|si) > 0. A finite path of length n is
a prefix ρ = s0s1 . . . sn of an infinite path, ending in state last(ρ) = sn. We denote by
Path(M(µ0)) (resp. FPath(M(µ0))) the set of infinite (finite) paths ofM(µ0). The obser-
vation of path ρ = s0s1 . . . is the word O(ρ) = O(s0)O(s1)... ∈ Σ∞. For a set R of paths,
O(R) = {O(ρ) | ρ ∈ R} and for a set W of observations, O−1(W ) = {ρ | O(ρ) ∈ W}. The
observation function is called non erasing if O(S) ⊆ Σ (all states are visible).
A probability measure PM(µ0) is defined on Path(M(µ0)), where the measurable sets
are generated by the cylinders Cyl(ρ), for ρ ∈ FPath(M(µ0)), containing the infinite paths
having ρ as prefix. Then PM(µ0) is inductively defined by: PM(µ0)(s) = µ0(s) for s ∈ S and
for ρ′ = ρs′, with last(ρ) = s, PM(µ0)(Cyl(ρ′)) = PM(µ0)(Cyl(ρ))p(s′|s). We sometimes write
PM(µ0)(ρ) instead of PM(µ0)(Cyl(ρ)) for ρ ∈ FPath(M) and for w ∈ Σ∗, PM(µ0)(w) instead
of PM(µ0)(∪ρ∈O−1(w)Cyl(ρ)).
We consider here the particular case where the secret is given by a subset of states
Sec ⊆ S of the model: a (finite of infinite) path s0s1 . . . is secret if si ∈ Sec for some i. We
first define a probabilistic version of disclosure w.r.t. some ε > 0 to answer the question:
Is there non-zero probability of observing some w that has probability more than 1− ε of
coming from a secret path?
I Definition 2 (ε-Disclosure). Given an MCM = (S, p,O), an initial distribution µ0, Sec ⊆ S
and an observation w ∈ Σ∗, the proportion of secret paths with observation w is:
PsecM(µ0)(w) =
PM(µ0)({ρ ∈ O−1(w) | ρ is secret})
PM(µ0)(w)
.
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For ε > 0, w is ε-min-disclosing if PsecM(µ0)(w) > 1 − ε and no prefix of w satisfies
this inequality. Writing Dεmin for the set of ε-min-disclosing observations, the ε-disclosure is
defined by Discε(M(µ0)) =
∑
w∈Dεmin
PM(µ0)(w). The positive ε-disclosure problem consists
in deciding if Discε(M(µ0)) > 0.
While being the most realistic notion of probabilistic disclosure, unfortunately the problem
is already undecidable for Markov chains:
I Theorem 3 (Undecidability of ε-disclosure). The positive ε-disclosure problem is undecidable
for MCs.
Like in further proofs, we use a reduction from a problem on Probabilistic Automata
(PA). Recall that a PA is a tuple A = (Q, q0,Act, T, F ) where Q is a finite set of states with
q0 ∈ Q the initial state, Act is a finite set of actions, T : Q× Act→ Dist(Q) is the transition
function and F ⊆ Q is the set of final states.
For a finite path ρ = q0
a1−→ q1 . . .
an−−→ qn of A, the word a1 . . . an ∈ Act∗ is called the trace
of ρ and denoted by tr(ρ). Writing FPath(w, q) = {ρ ∈ FPath | tr(ρ) = w and last(ρ) = q}
for w ∈ Act∗ and q ∈ Q, we define PqA(w) = PA(∪ρ∈FPath(w,q)Cylρ), PFA(w) =
∑
q∈F P
q
A(w)
and val(A) = supw∈Act∗PFA(w).
Given a threshold θ ∈ [0, 1[, we set L>θ(A) = {w ∈ Act∗ | PFA(w) > θ}. The strict
emptiness problem for A, asking whether this set is empty or not, is known to be undecidable
for θ > 0 [18]. The value 1 problem, asking whether val(A) = 1 is undecidable as well [13].
Sketch of Proof. Given a PAA, we build a Markov chainMA with initial distribution µ0 and
secret Sec such that for any ε, 0 < ε < 1, L>1−ε(A) is not empty iff Discε(MA(µ0)) > 0. J
This leads us to return to the simpler case where the disclosure is the probability of the
set of paths leaking the secret, i.e., such that all paths with the same observation are secret.
The ω-disclosure (corresponding to measures in [3, 6, 4]) was defined for a Markov chain
M = (S, p,O) with initial distribution µ0 by considering a measurable set of secret paths
SPath ⊆ Path(M(µ0)). Here, as mentioned above, SPath is Reach(Sec), the set of infinite
paths visiting a state from Sec, and an infinite observation w ∈ Σω discloses the secret if all
paths ρ ∈ O−1(w) are secret. Setting SPath = Path(M(µ0)) \ SPath, we define:
I Definition 4 (ω-Disclosure). For an MCM = (S, p,O), an initial distribution µ0 and a
subset Sec ⊆ S, with SPath = Reach(Sec), the ω-disclosure is defined by:
Discω(M(µ0)) = PM(µ0)(SPath \ O−1(O(SPath))).
To obtain measures directly related to the finite observation of a possible attacker, we
assume that M = (S, p,O) is convergent: each infinite path ρ has an infinite observation
O(ρ) ∈ Σω. Two measures can then be defined, when considering a fixed or finite horizon. In
the former case, we consider a non-erasing function O to obtain real-time observations.
I Definition 5 (Disclosure of MCs). LetM = (S, p,O) be an MC, µ0 an initial distribution
and Sec ⊆ S. A finite observation w ∈ Σ∗ discloses the secret if all paths ρ ∈ O−1(w) are
secret. It is min-disclosing if it discloses the secret and no strict prefix of w does.
n-disclosure : When O is non-erasing, we denote by Dn, for n ∈ N, the set of disclosing
observations of length n. The n-disclosure is Discn(M(µ0)) =
∑
w∈Dn PM(µ0)(w);
Disclosure : Writing Dmin for the set of min-disclosing observations, the disclosure (w.r.t.
finite horizon) is defined by Disc(M(µ0)) =
∑
w∈Dmin PM(µ0)(w).
Note that if D is the set of disclosing observations, and V(µ0) = ∪w∈D ∪ρ∈O−1(w) Cyl(ρ)
the set of paths disclosing the secret, then Disc(M(µ0)) is also equal to PM(µ0)(V(µ0)).
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I Remark. Without loss of generality, we can assume that once a secret state has been
reached by an execution, all subsequent states remain secret. For this, a new Markov
chainM′ = (S′, p′,O′) is defined fromM by: S′ = Sec ] ((S \ Sec)× {0, 1}), where (s, 0)
represents state s where the secret has not been visited while (s, 1) represents the opposite
situation. The transitions are then duplicated accordingly: (1) p′((s′, i)|(s, i)) = p(s′|s) for
all s, s′ ∈ S \ Sec, and i = 0, 1, (2) p′((s′, 1)|s) = p(s′|s) for all s ∈ Sec, and s′ ∈ S \ Sec, (3)
p′(s′|(s, i)) = p(s′|s) for all s ∈ S \ Sec, i = 0, 1, and s′ ∈ Sec, and (4) p′(s′|s) = p(s′|s) for
all s, s′ ∈ Sec. The observation function is extended by O′((s, i)) = O(s) for all s ∈ S \ Sec
and i = 0, 1 and the new set of secrets is Sec ] ((S \ Sec) × {1}). There is a one-to-one
probability-preserving correspondence between the paths inM and those inM′.
We show that disclosure and ω-disclosure may be different by consider the infinitely
branching MC of Figure 2, with initial distribution 1q0 , Sec = {qs} hence SPath = {q0qωs },
O(SPath) = o+1 oω2 . Then Discω = 12 but since no finite observation is disclosing, Disc = 0.
o1
q0
o1
qs
o2
q11
o1
q21
o2
q22
...
o1
qi1
. . .
i− 2 steps
o1
qi(i−1)
o2
qii
...
1 1
1
1
1
2
1
4
1
8
1
2i+1
1
1 1 1
Figure 2 An infinitely branching MC with Sec = {qs}, Discω = 12 and Disc = 0.
However, both notions coincide for convergent finitely branching MCs.
I Lemma 6 (Comparison of Disclosure Notions). LetM = (S, p,O) be a Markov chain, µ0 an
initial distribution and Sec ⊆ S. For SPath = Reach(Sec), Disc(M(µ0)) ≤ Discω(M(µ0))
and equality holds ifM is convergent and finitely branching.
2.2 Opacity for Markov Decision Processes
We now turn to MDPs that combine non determinism with probabilistic transitions.
I Definition 7 (MDP). A Markov Decision Process (MDP) over alphabet Σ is a tuple
M = (S,Act, p,O) where S is a finite set of states, Act = ∪s∈SA(s) where A(s) is a finite
non-empty set of actions for each state s ∈ S, p : S×Act→ Dist(S) is the (partial) transition
function defined for (s, a) when a ∈ A(s) and O : S → Σ ∪ {ε} is the observation function.
As before, we write p(s′|s, a) instead of p(s, a)(s′). Given an initial distribution µ0, an infinite
path of M is a sequence ρ = s0a0s1a1 . . . where µ0(s0) > 0 and p(si+1|si, ai) > 0, for si ∈ S,
ai ∈ A(si), for all i ≥ 0. Finite paths (ending in a state) and observation of a path are
defined like for Markov chains, and we use similar notations for the various sets of paths.
For decidability and complexity results, we assume that all probabilities occurring in the
model (transition probabilities and initial distribution) are rationals.
Nondeterminism is resolved by strategies. Given a finite path ρ with last(ρ) = s, a
decision rule for ρ is a distribution on the possible actions in A(s) chosen at this point. For
such a decision rule δ, we write p(s′|s, δ) =
∑
a∈A(s) δ(a)p(s′|s, a).
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I Definition 8 (Strategy). A strategy of MDP M = (S,Act, p,O) with initial distribution µ0
is a mapping σ : FPath(M(µ0))→ Dist(Act) associating with ρ a decision rule σ(ρ).
Given a strategy σ, a path ρ = s0a0s1a1 . . . of M is σ-compatible if for all i, ai ∈
Supp(σ(s0a0s1a1 . . . si)). A strategy σ is deterministic if σ(ρ) is a Dirac distribution for
each finite path ρ. In this case, we denote by σ(ρ) the single action a ∈ A(last(ρ)) such that
σ(ρ) = 1a. A strategy σ is observation-based if for any finite path ρ, σ(ρ) only depends on
the observation sequence O(ρ) and the current state last(ρ), writing σ(O(ρ), last(ρ)) for σ(ρ).
Let σ be a strategy and ρ be a σ-compatible path. We define Bσρ the belief of ρ w.r.t. σ
about states corresponding to the last observation as follows:
Bσρ = {s | ∃ρ′ σ-compatible, O(ρ′) = O(ρ) ∧ s = last(ρ′) ∧O(s) 6= ε}
A strategy σ is belief-based if for all ρ, σ(ρ) only depends on its belief Bσρ and its current
state last(ρ). Observe that a belief-based strategy is observation-based since Bσρ only depends
on w = O(ρ). So we also write Bσw for Bσρ . A strategy σ is memoryless if σ(ρ) only depends
on last(ρ) for all ρ.
A strategy σ on M(µ0) defines a (possibly infinite) Markov chain Mσ(µ0) with set
of states FPath(Mσ(µ0)) (the finite σ-compatible paths), that can be equipped with the
observation function associating O(last(ρ)) with the finite path ρ. The transition function
pσ is defined for ρ ∈ FPath(Mσ(µ0)) and ρ′ = ρas′ by pσ(ρ′|ρ) = σ(ρ)(a)p(s′|s, a) and we
denote by PMσ(µ0) (or Pσ for short when there is no ambiguity) the associated probability
measure. Writing Vσ(µ0) for the set of paths disclosing the secret in Mσ(µ0), we have
Disc(Mσ(µ0)) = PMσ(µ0)(Vσ(µ0)).
Disclosure values for MDPs are defined according to the status of the strategies, by
considering them as adversarial or cooperative with respect to the system (we only consider
ε-disclosure for fixed horizon in view of the undecidability result of Theorem 3).
I Definition 9 (Disclosure of an MDP). Given an MDP M = (S,Act, p,O), an initial
distribution µ0 and a secret Sec ⊆ S, the maximal disclosure of Sec in M is discmax(M(µ0)) =
supσ disc(Mσ(µ0)) and the minimal disclosure is discmin(M(µ0)) = infσ disc(Mσ(µ0)) for
disc ∈ {Disc,Discn, Discεn}, n ∈ N and 0 < ε < 1.
Note that the construction ensuring that once a secret state is visited, the path remains
secret forever, extends naturally from Markov chains to MDPs. We consider only MDPs of
this form in the sequel. We now show that for disclosure problems we can restrict strategies
to observation-based ones.
I Proposition 10 (Observation-based strategies). Given an MDP, a secret and a strategy σ,
there exists an observation-based strategy σ′ with the same disclosure values.
Erasing observations leads to technical and cumbersome developments. In order to avoid
them in the design of procedures for the finite horizon case, we apply the preliminary trans-
formation described in the next proposition. We precisely state the size of the transformed
MDP in view of complexity results.
I Proposition 11 (Avoiding erasing observations). Given an MDP M = (S,Act, p,O), an
initial distribution µ0 and a secret Sec, one can build in exponential time an MDP M′ =
(S′,Act′, p′,O′), an initial distribution µ′0 and a secret Sec′ where O′ is non-erasing and for
disc ∈ {Discmin, Discmax} disc(M(µ0)) = disc(M′(µ′0)). In addition, the size of S′, p′ and
µ′0 is polynomial w.r.t. those of S′, p′ and µ′0. The size of Act
′ is polynomial w.r.t. the size
of Act and exponential w.r.t. the size of S.
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We study the following problems over MDPs:
Computation problems. The value problem: compute the disclosure and the strategy
problem: compute an optimal strategy whenever it exists;
Quantitative decision problems. The disclosure problem: Given M and a threshold
θ ∈ [0, 1], is disc(M) ./ θ? with ./ = ≥ for maximisation and ./ = ≤ for minimisation,
and the more demanding strategy decision problem: does there exist a strategy σ such
that disc(Mσ) ./ θ?
Qualitative decision problems. The limit-sure disclosure problem: the disclosure
problem when θ = 1 for maximisation and θ = 0 for minimisation and the almost-sure
disclosure problem: the strategy decision problem with the same restrictions.
For the complexity results regarding a fixed horizon n, we will assume that n is written
in unary representation or bounded by a polynomial in the size of the model where the
polynomial is independent of the model as done in classical studies (see for instance [17]).
3 Maximisation with finite horizon
While strategies may be randomised, this additional power is not necessary for maximisation:
I Proposition 12 (Dominance of deterministic strategies). Given an MDP, a secret and an
observation-based strategy σ there exists a deterministic observation-based strategy σ′ with
greater or equal disclosure of the secret.
Sketch of Proof. The Lemma 1 of [10] (or alternatively [14]) does not directly give the
result as, contrary to the objectives used in their paper, disclosure depends on the strategy.
However, as a disclosing path for a randomised strategy is also a disclosing path for a
deterministic strategy that does not introduce new paths, we can use parts of their proof to
show our result. J
An edge can be completely blocked by some strategy, modifying the set of paths that
disclose the secret. This was illustrated in Figure 1a, where choosing action a in state q0
removes the edges to q3 and q4. This situation was excluded in the computation of the
disclosure presented in [4], where the general problem was left open for Interval Markov
Chains (IMCs). We answer negatively by proving undecidability of the disclosure problem,
hence the disclosure cannot be computed in general. Undecidability also holds for limit-sure
disclosure.
Writing I for the set of intervals in [0, 1], an IMC (with observation) is a tuple M =
(S, sinit, I,O) where S is the set of states, sinit is the initial state, I : S → IS associates
with any state s ∈ S a mapping from S into I, and O : S → Σ ∪ {ε} is the observation
function. An IMC can be transformed into an (exponentially larger) MDP where actions are
the basic feasible solutions of the linear program specified by the constraints associated with
intervals [20]. Thus undecidability results for IMCs also hold for MDPs.
I Theorem 13 (Undecidability of maximal finite horizon disclosure). The maximal finite horizon
disclosure problem is undecidable for MDPs, even when the secret is reached with probability
1 and for a non-erasing observation function.
The maximal finite horizon disclosure problem when restricted to finite-memory strategies is
also undecidable (with the same additional assumptions).
Sketch of Proof. Starting from a PA A, we build an IMC MA = (S, s0, I,O) such that there
exists a word w ∈ {a, b}∗ with PFA(w) > 12 if and only if Discmax(MA) >
1
4 . While similar
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to the one of Theorem 3, the proof is more involved because the strategies must be taken
into account. J
As a consequence, we obtain:
I Corollary 14. The maximal finite horizon disclosure of an MDP cannot be computed.
Using a reduction of the value 1 problem in PA, we also have:
I Theorem 15 (Undecidability of maximal finite horizon limit-sure disclosure). The maximal
finite horizon limit-sure disclosure problem is undecidable for MDPs.
Fortunately the maximal finite-horizon almost-sure disclosure problem is decidable. The
proof relies on results for partially observable MDPs (POMDPs): a POMDP is an MDP
where the strategies resolving the non determinism only depend on the observation sequence
and do not take the current state into account.
I Theorem 16 (Decidability of maximal finite-horizon almost-sure disclosure). The maximal
finite-horizon almost-sure disclosure problem in MDPs is EXPTIME-complete. Moreover, if
the system is almost-surely disclosing, one can build a belief-based strategy with disclosure 1.
Sketch of Proof. We reduce the almost-sure disclosure problem for maximisation in MDPs
to almost-sure reachability in a POMDP. The POMDP we build is exponential in the size of
the original MDP and the algorithm to solve almost-sure reachability is exponential in the
size of the POMDP [11]. This gives an EXPTIME algorithm as those two exponentials do
not stack. The hardness is obtained by a reduction from the safety problem in games with
imperfect information that was shown to be EXPTIME-complete in [8]. J
4 Minimisation with finite horizon
Recall from the example illustrated in Figure 1a of introduction, that randomised strategies
are necessary for minimisation. To address this issue we introduce families of almost
deterministic strategies based on ε-decision rules, that will be used in the decision procedures.
I Definition 17. Let δ be the deterministic decision rule for state s selecting action a ∈ A(s).
Then δε ∈ Dist(A(s)) is a (randomised) ε-decision rule, said to favour a, and defined by:
1. If |A(s)| > 1 then δε(a) = 1− ε and for all b ∈ A(s) \ {a}, δε(b) = ε|A(s)|−1 ;
2. Else δε(a) = 1.
I Definition 18. Let σ be an observation-based deterministic strategy. Then {σε}ε>0 is
a family of observation-based almost deterministic strategies defined for any state s and
w ∈ Σn, an observation of length n ∈ N, by: σε(w, s) = σ(w, s)2−nε.
Using Proposition 11, we assume that the observation function O is non-erasing. The
complexity of the transformation does not affect the results since the complexities are all
polynomial in the number of actions. To compute the minimal disclosure value, we build from
an MDP M, another MDP Mmin which is a “correct abstraction” (as stated by Proposition 19)
for reducing minimal disclosure problems to minimal reachability problems, by enlarging
states with the maximal belief that can occur independently of the action that has been
selected.
Given a set of potential current states B and a new observation o, we define the maximal
set of potential next states NextMax(B, o) over decision rules applied to B by:
NextMax(B, o) = {s′ ∈ O−1(o) | ∃s ∈ B ∃a ∈ A(s) p(s′|s, a) > 0}
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Observe that given a family of almost deterministic strategies {σε} and a path ρas of M
with O(s) = o, one has Bσερas = NextMax(Bσερ , o). Then Mmin is formally defined as follows:
Smin, the set of states, is defined by: Smin = {(s,B) | s ∈ B ⊆ O−1(O(s))};
Let (s,B) ∈ Smin. Then A(s,B) = A(s);
Let (s,B), (s′, B′) ∈ Smin. If B′ = NextMax(B,O(s′)) then p((s′, B′)|(s,B), a) = p(s′|s, a)
else p((s′, B′)|(s,B), a) = 0.
Given µ0 an initial distribution over S, the associated initial distribution µmin over Smin is
defined by µmin(s, Supp(µ0) ∩ O−1(O(s))) = µ0(s) and µmin(s,B) = 0 for all other B. We
define the subset Avoid(Sec) ⊆ Smin by Avoid(Sec) = {(s,B)|B ⊆ Sec}.
I Proposition 19. The minimal disclosure value for Sec in M(µ0) is equal to the minimal
probability to reach Avoid(Sec) in Mmin(µmin). Furthermore it is asymptotically reached by a
family of belief-based almost deterministic strategies.
Since minimal reachability probability in MDPs can be computed in polynomial time
we immediately obtain the first part of the next theorem. We establish the second part
(PSPACE-hardness) in the proof of Theorem 23.
I Theorem 20. The minimal disclosure value of M(µ0) can be computed in EXPTIME. The
associated decision problem is PSPACE-hard.
We now turn to the existence of a strategy that achieves the minimal value and establish
that it can be analysed without additional complexity. The main ingredient of the proof is
an equation system over states of the MDP whose unique solution is the minimal reachability
probability vector.
Notations. Given µ a distribution over states and ~δ a vector of decision rules over states in
the support of µ, we define NextDist(µ,~δ) the next distribution over S when applying ~δ by:
NextDist(µ,~δ)(s′) =
∑
s∈Supp(µ)
µ(s)p(s′|s, ~δ[s]) for any s′ ∈ S.
For a distribution µ over S and o ∈ Σ, we write µ(o) for µ(O−1(o)). If Supp(µ)∩O−1(o) 6=
∅, the relative distribution µo over O−1(o) is defined by: µo(s) = µ(s)µ(o) for s ∈ O
−1(o) and
µo(s) = 0 otherwise.
We have Discmin(M(µ)) =
∑
o∈Σ µ(o)Discmin(M(µo)). For use in the next proof, we
define disc∗(M(s,B)) as the minimal disclosure value when starting in M in state s with belief
B. Given some belief B and some decision rule vector ~δ over B we introduce the possible
successors of B when applying ~δ: Next(B,~δ) = {s′ | ∃s ∈ B ∃a ∈ Supp(~δ[s]) p(s′|s, a) > 0}
and Next(B,~δ, o) = Next(B,~δ) ∩ O−1(o).
I Theorem 21. The existence of a strategy that achieves the minimal disclosure value can
be decided in EXPTIME. In the positive case, this strategy can be computed in EXPTIME.
Proof. The algorithm simultaneously solves the existence and the synthesis problem.
Using proposition 19, the algorithm computes for all (s,B) ∈ Smin, disc∗(M(s,B)).
Then it maintains a set Win of beliefs initially set to all beliefs from which it iteratively
eliminates items and stops when no more elimination is possible.
Given B ∈Win, it looks for a decision rule vector ~δ over B such that:
for all o ∈ O(Next(B,~δ)), Next(B,~δ, o) ∈Win;
for all s ∈ B, disc∗(M(s,B)) =
∑
o∈Σ
∑
s′∈O−1(o) p(s′|s, ~δ[s])disc∗(M(s′,Next(B,~δ, o))).
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If such a ~δ does not exist then B is eliminated from Win. Each iteration can be performed
in polynomial time w.r.t. |Smin| and the number of iterations is at most |Smin|. Observe
that when a belief is eliminated, it should not be “reached” by a strategy that obtains the
minimal disclosure value. So the elimination is sound.
When the elimination stops, the algorithm answers positively iff for all o ∈ O(Supp(µ0)),
Supp(µ0) ∩ O−1(o) ∈Win. Thus by the soundness of the elimination step, if the answer is
negative there is no optimal strategy for minimal disclosure value.
If the answer is positive, let us consider the belief-based strategy σ defined by applying the
decision rules obtained during the last iteration of the algorithm. On the one hand, under σ
when visiting a state s with belief B such that disc∗(M(s,B)) = 0, one never leaves such kind
of pairs of states and beliefs. So the secret is never disclosed, showing that the disclosure
value obtained by σ for such (s,B) is null. Under σ the disclosure value of all the other
pairs of state and belief fulfill the equations of the elimination step. It is known that the
single solution of this system is the vector of minimal reachability probabilities of Avoid in
Mmin(µmin) (see [1] for instance) which yields the result. J
5 Fixed horizon problems
5.1 Maximal disclosure
In order to compute the value of the maximal disclosure within a fixed horizon, one could
build the POMDP described in the proof of Theorem 16 then use pre-existing results on
POMDPs. This would result in an EXPTIME algorithm, whereas we obtain in the result
below an algorithm with a better complexity in PSPACE.
I Theorem 22 (Computation of the maximal disclosure value within fixed-horizon). The fixed-
horizon maximal value (when the horizon n is described in unary representation) is computable
in PSPACE and the fixed-horizon maximal disclosure problem is PSPACE-complete.
Sketch of proof - value and membership. We first order the observation alphabet Σ. Then
a non deterministic decision procedure operating in PSPACE orderly reads every observation
sequence of length n while maintaining the sets of states that were possible after every prefix
of this observation, the actions that were chosen nondeterministically in those states and
values used in the computation of the disclosure. The information kept is of polynomial size
and when every observation has been read, one of the values computed will be exactly the
disclosure of the system at time n. We then remove the non determinism using Savitch’s
Theorem. In order to get the value we observe that we can compute the polynomially sized
denominator of this value and then we proceed by iterations of the decision algorithm. J
As can be seen in the proof, the optimal strategy could be computed when solving the value
problem. However the size of this strategy may be exponential due to the beliefs and thus
this strategy is computable in EXPTIME.
For the hardness result, we reduce the truth of a Quantified Boolean Formula (QBF).
Recall that QBFs are extension of propositional formulas where boolean variables can be
quantified. Syntactically, the formulas are described by the following grammar:
φ ::= ψ | ∃x.φ | ∀x.φ
ψ ::= x | ψ ∧ ψ | ψ ∨ ψ | ¬ψ | true
A QBF is closed if every boolean variable is bound by a quantifier. Deciding if a closed
QBF is equivalent to true is PSPACE-hard [21].
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Sketch of proof - hardness. Given φ a closed QBF (w.l.o.g. in 3CNF with n variables and
m clauses), we build an MDP M such that φ is true iff the disclosure of M is greater or equal
to 122n in 2(n+m) + 3 steps. In fact,
1
22n is exactly the measure of paths reaching the secret
in 2(n+m) + 3 steps, thus every path reaching the secret must be disclosing. Such a path
discloses the secret iff a boolean variable of φ and its negation (x and ¬x for example) do
not occur in its observation.
In M, during the first 2n steps, an assignment will be ‘given’ to each boolean variable:
(i) for each existentially quantified boolean variable x, the strategy chooses whether x or
¬x occurs in the observation and (ii) for each universally quantified boolean variable y, by
a random choice with probability 12 . During the last 2m steps, the strategy must trigger
a boolean variable in every clause of φ so that if a clause is not satisfied by the current
assignment, then a boolean variable will be observed as both true and false during the path.
Thus the observation would not disclose the secret. J
The existence of an optimal strategy here implies that the limit-sure and the almost-sure
problem are equivalent. Moreover, the secret being revealed with probability 1 in a given
number of steps implies that every path reaches the secret in this number of steps. Therefore
the almost-sure problem can be seen as a reachability problem in an MDP which can be
solved in polynomial time.
The proof of hardness can be adapted for ε-disclosure, but the algorithm for membership
can not be directly applied. The ε-disclosure could however be computed by minimising an
exponential system of equations, resulting in an exponential time algorithm.
5.2 Minimal disclosure
The proofs of the two first assertions of the next theorem are similar to the proof of Theorem 22.
However in order to get the same complexity for the last assertion, we establish that when a
randomised decision rule must be selected in the optimal strategy, it can always be uniformly
distributed over its support.
I Theorem 23 (Minimal disclosure within fixed horizon). The fixed horizon minimal value is
computable in PSPACE. The fixed horizon minimal disclosure problem is PSPACE-complete.
In addition, the strategy decision problem is also decidable in PSPACE.
Contrary to the case of maximisation, the above proof implies PSPACE-completeness for
the limit-sure and almost-sure problem for minimisation.
The remark on ε-disclosure of the previous subsection holds again here.
6 Conclusion
We revisit the problems of disclosure for MDPs by (1) taking into account general actions
contrary to previous work and (2) considering both maximisation and minimisation problems.
We almost fully characterise the decidability and complexity of those problems establishing
an asymmetry between minimisation and maximisation problems: the former ones being
easier although they require families of randomised strategies for reaching the optimal value.
There remains a complexity gap (PSPACE versus EXPTIME) for the finite-horizon minim-
isation problem that we want to fill. From a qualitative point of view, observe that disclosure
is a hyperproperty as its truth value is defined relatively to a set of paths. Thus we plan to
address such kinds of properties in a restricted setting in order to get other decidability results.
Another direction would be to strengthen the requirement for approximate ε-disclosure to
regain decidability within finite horizon.
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A Semantics
Recall that the strict emptiness and the value 1 problems are undecidable for PA already for
an alphabet with two letters. Hence in the various reductions we use the alphabet {a, b}.
I Theorem 3 (Undecidability of ε-disclosure). The positive ε-disclosure problem is undecidable
for MCs.
Proof. Given a PA A = (Q, q0, {a, b}, T, F ) that we suppose complete without loss of
generality, we first transform A into an incomplete MC Â where {a, b, [} is the observation
alphabet (an illustration is given in Figure 3). The set of states is Q̂ = Q ∪ {qc | q ∈ Q ∧ c ∈
{a, b}}, with initial distribution 1q0 . The observation function Ô is defined by Ô(q) = [ and
Ô(qc) = c for q ∈ Q and c ∈ {a, b}. The transition function p̂ is defined for q, q′ ∈ Q and
c ∈ {a, b} by p̂(q′ | qc) = T (q′ | q, c) and p̂(qc | q) = 14 .
A :
q
q2
q1
q3
Â :
[q
a
qa
b
qb
[
q1
[
q2
[
q3
a, 12
a, 12 b,
2
3
b, 13
1
4
1
4
1
2
1
2
2
3
1
3
Figure 3 From PA A to incomplete MC Â.
[
q0
[
q
[
qf
Â
]
spub
]
ssec
1
1
1
2
1
2
Figure 4 Reduction to the positive ε-disclosure problem.
We now build the MCMA = (S, p,O) over alphabet {a, b, [, ]} by adding two states to
complete Â (see Figure 4 where doubly circled state qf is a final state of A):
S = {spub, ssec} ∪ Q̂, with Sec = {ssec};
The function p is obtained from p̂ by adding the transitions: For q ∈ F , p(ssec | q) = 12 ,
for q ∈ Q \ F , p(spub | q) = 12 , and p(spub | spub) = p(ssec | ssec) = 1;
O extends Ô by O(ssec) = O(spub) = ].
We now prove that, given ε ∈]0, 1[, A admits a word with probability strictly greater than
1 − ε iff Discε(M(µ0)) > 0. First assume that there exists a word w = a1 . . . an ∈ {a, b}∗
with PFA(w) > 1 − ε. Then w corresponds to a non secret path with observation ŵ =
[a1[ . . . an[ inMA and PsecM(µ0)(ŵ]) = PFA(w) > 1− ε, which implies Discε(M(µ0)) > 0.
Conversely, if Discε(M(µ0)) > 0, then there exists an observation w′ in ({a, b, [, ]})∗ such
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that PsecM(µ0)(w′) > 1− ε. In this case, w′ belongs to [a1[ . . . an[]]∗ for some w = a1 . . . an
such that PsecM(µ0)(w′) = PsecM(µ0)([a1[ . . . an[]) = PFA(w) and L>1−ε(A) is not empty.
J
I Lemma 6 (Comparison of Disclosure Notions). LetM = (S, p,O) be a Markov chain, µ0 an
initial distribution and Sec ⊆ S. For SPath = Reach(Sec), Disc(M(µ0)) ≤ Discω(M(µ0))
and equality holds ifM is convergent and finitely branching.
Proof. We first establish:
Claim. IfM is convergent and finitely branching, then the set of paths ρ such that O(ρ) is
of length n is finite for any n > 0.
In this context, similarly to [7], we define a signaling path as a finite path ρ such that
O(last(ρ)) 6= ε and we denote by SP the set of signaling paths. We first prove the claim
for such paths. By induction, we start with n = 1 and consider the tree formed by the
set O1 = {ρ ∈ SP | |O(ρ)| = 1} by sharing common prefixes. Internal nodes of this tree
correspond to unobservable states while all leaves are observable. Since the chain is finitely
branching, the tree is of bounded degree. By contradiction, assume that the tree is infinite.
König’s lemma yields an infinite branch containing only unobservable states, which contradicts
the hypothesis of convergence. The induction step is obtained by a similar argument. The
general case also follows the same lines since any path ρ with an observation of length n has
a signaling prefix ρ′ with the same observation. Hence the tree of suffixes of ρ′ must also be
finite.
We now prove that V = ∪w∈D ∪ρ∈O−1(w) Cyl(ρ) is contained in SPath \ O−1(O(SPath)).
Let ρ1 be an infinite path in V. Then there is a disclosing observation w1 ∈ Σ∗ and a
signaling prefix ρ′1 of ρ1 such that O(ρ′1) = w1 and ρ′1 is secret. For any infinite path ρ2
such that O(ρ1) = O(ρ2), the observation w1 is also a prefix of O(ρ2), hence there is a finite
signaling prefix ρ′2 of ρ2 such that O(ρ′2) = w1. Since w1 is disclosing, ρ′2 is also secret, hence
ρ1 belongs to SPath \ O−1(O(SPath)) and Disc(M(µ0)) ≤ Discω(M(µ0)).
For the converse inclusion, let ρ be an infinite path in SPath \ O−1(O(SPath)) with
observation O(ρ) = w = o1o2 . . . ∈ Σω. We prove by contradiction that there is a finite
disclosing prefix ŵ of w and a signaling prefix ρ̂ of ρ such that ρ ∈ Cyl(ρ̂) and O(ρ̂) = ŵ.
Otherwise, for any n ≥ 1, wn = o1 . . . on is not disclosing and there exists a signaling path
ρn such that O(ρn) = wn but ρn is not secret. The set T = {ρ′ ∈ SP | ∃n ρ′ ≤ ρn} of all
signaling prefixes of the ρn’s form a tree: the root of the tree is ε and the nodes at level k
are the prefixes with observation wk: {ρ′ ∈ T | |O(ρ′)| = k}. A node ρ′′ is a child of ρ′ if
|O(ρ′)| = wk, |O(ρ′′)| = wk+1 for some k and ρ′ ≤ ρ′′. From the claim, we know that T is of
bounded degree. Assuming that it is infinite, König’s lemma again yields an infinite branch
ρ∞ such that each prefix of length k is not secret and has observation wk. Hence ρ∞ is not
secret and has observation O(ρ∞) = w, which is a contradiction. J
I Proposition 10 (Observation-based strategies). Given an MDP, a secret and a strategy σ,
there exists an observation-based strategy σ′ with the same disclosure values.
Proof. Let M = (S,Act, p,O) be an MDP with initial distribution µ0. Given a strategy σ,
we note Pσ instead of PMσ(µ0) for the associated probability measure. For an observation
w ∈ Σ∗ and a state s ∈ S, we define the sets (which are finite from the claim in the lemma
above) R(w, s) = {ρ ∈ FPath(Mσ(µ0)) | O(ρ) = w ∧ last(ρ) = s}.
We now define a mapping σ̂ from Σ∗ × S into Dist(Act) by
σ̂(w, s) = 1∑
ρ∈R(w,s) Pσ(ρ)
∑
ρ∈R(w,s)
Pσ(ρ)σ(ρ)
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and a new strategy σ′ for a finite path ρ by σ′(ρ) = σ̂(O(ρ), last(ρ)). We prove that
Pσ′(R(w, s)) = Pσ(R(w, s)) for any observation w and any state s, which entails equality of
disclosure.
Partitioning the set of states into S = Sob ] Su where Su = O−1(ε), we can assume a
topological sort on the subgraph obtained by removing all edges in S × Sob (this subgraph
is acyclic due to the hypothesis of convergence). We denote by η the mapping numbering
all states according to the total order and we proceed to prove the claim above by a joint
induction on the pairs (w, s) using |w| and η(s).
For the base cases, we need to establish the property for w = ε with s ∈ Su, and for
w ∈ Σ with s ∈ Sob, where µ0(s) > 0 in both cases.
Case 1. By induction on η(s), we consider a state s ∈ Su such that η(s) = mins′∈Su(η(s′)).
Then Pσ′(R(ε, s)) = µ0(s) = Pσ(R(ε, s)). Assuming the property holds for (ε, s) with
η(s) ≤ n, we prove it for s′ with η(s′) = n+ 1. We have:
Pσ′(R(ε, s′)) = µ0(s′) +
∑
s∈Su,η(s)<η(s′)
∑
a∈A(s)
p(s′|s, a)
∑
ρ∈R(ε,s)
Pσ′(ρ)σ′(ρ)(a)
and using the definition of σ′ yields:
Pσ′(R(ε, s′)) = µ0(s′) +
∑
s∈Su,η(s)<η(s′)
∑
a∈A(s)
p(s′|s, a)σ̂(ε, s)(a)
∑
ρ∈R(ε,s)
Pσ′(ρ)
= µ0(s′) +
∑
s∈Su,η(s)<η(s′)
∑
a∈A(s)
p(s′|s, a)
∑
ρ∈R(ε,s) Pσ(ρ)σ(ρ)(a)∑
ρ∈R(ε,s) Pσ(ρ)
∑
ρ∈R(ε,s)
Pσ′(ρ).
Applying the induction hypothesis on (ε, s) yields
∑
ρ∈R(ε,s) Pσ′(ρ) = Pσ′(R(ε, s)) =
Pσ(R(ε, s)) =
∑
ρ∈R(ε,s) Pσ(ρ) thus:
Pσ′(R(ε, s′)) = µ0(s′) +
∑
s∈Su,η(s)<η(s′)
∑
a∈A(s)
p(s′|s, a)
∑
ρ∈R(ε,s)
Pσ(ρ)σ(ρ)(a) = Pσ(R(ε, s′)).
Case 2. We now consider w = o ∈ Σ and s′ ∈ Sob, hence O(s′) = o. Then:
Pσ′(R(o, s′)) = µ0(s′) +
∑
s∈Su
∑
a∈A(s)
p(s′|s, a)
∑
ρ∈R(ε,s)
Pσ′(ρ)σ′(ρ)(a)
and a reasoning similar as above yields the result.
For the induction step, we first need to prove the property for (w, s′) with s′ ∈ Su,
assuming it holds for all (w, s) with s ∈ Sob and for all (w, s) with s ∈ Su and η(s) < η(s′).
Then we have:
Pσ′(R(w, s′)) =
∑
s∈Sob
s∈Su,η(s)<η(s′)
∑
a∈A(s)
p(s′|s, a)
∑
ρ∈R(w,s)
Pσ′(ρ)σ′(ρ)(a)
and we can conclude along the same lines as above.
Finally, we consider (w′, s′) with w′ = wo and s ∈ Sob, with:
Pσ′(R(w′, s′)) =
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈A(s)
p(s′|s, a)
∑
ρ∈R(w,s)
Pσ′(ρ)σ′(ρ)(a)
which again implies the desired result.
J
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I Proposition 11 (Avoiding erasing observations). Given an MDP M = (S,Act, p,O), an
initial distribution µ0 and a secret Sec, one can build in exponential time an MDP M′ =
(S′,Act′, p′,O′), an initial distribution µ′0 and a secret Sec′ where O′ is non-erasing and for
disc ∈ {Discmin, Discmax} disc(M(µ0)) = disc(M′(µ′0)). In addition, the size of S′, p′ and
µ′0 is polynomial w.r.t. those of S′, p′ and µ′0. The size of Act
′ is polynomial w.r.t. the size
of Act and exponential w.r.t. the size of S.
Proof. We first build the new MDP and then explain the correspondence between strategies
in both models.
Construction of the MDP. We start from MDP M = (S,Act, p,O) with Act = ∪s∈SA(s),
observation alphabet Σ, and a set of secret states Sec ⊆ S. Choosing a fresh observation
symbol ] and a fresh state s], we build a MDP M′ = (S′,Act′, p′,O′) with set of states
S′ = {s]} ∪ (S \ O−1(ε)), and observation alphabet Σ ∪ {]}, where the initial distribution is
1s] .
The observation function O′ is defined by O′(s]) = ] and O′(s) = O(s) otherwise. The set
of actions of M′ is Act′ = DR where DR is the set of vectors of deterministic decision rules ~δ
over S, i.e. such that ~δ(s) ∈ A(s).
For a path ρ = s0a1 . . . ansn, we write π(ρ) =
∏n
i=1 p(si|si−1, ai) and first(ρ) = s0. Given
a state s 6= s], an action ~δ ∈ DR and an observable state s′, we consider the finite set P̂ (s, ~δ, s′)
of paths ρ = s0a1 . . . ansn starting in s0 = s and ending in sn = s′ such that all intermediate
states are unobservable (and so distinct by convergence of the MDP) and for each i, 1 < i ≤ n,
ai = ~δ(si−1). We set p̂(s′|s, ~δ) =
∑
ρ∈P̂ (s,~δ,s′) π(ρ). Note that P̂ (s, ~δ, s
′) may include paths
like ρ = s ~δ(s)s′. The transition function p′ is defined by: p′(s′ | s, ~δ) = p̂(s′|s, ~δ).
Since the initial distribution µ′0 of M′ is Dirac on s], transitions from this state are
defined similarly as above but they must take into account the initial distribution µ0 of M.
Given an observable state s ∈ S and ~δ ∈ DR, the set P̂ (s], ~δ, s) contains the finite paths
ρ = s0a1s1 . . . ansn starting from some s0 ∈ Supp(µ0) and ending in sn = s such that all
states s0, . . . , sn−1 are unobservable, and ai = ~δ(si−1) for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In this case, we
set p̂(s | s], ~δ) =
∑
ρ∈P̂ (s],~δ,s) µ0(first(ρ))π(ρ). If s ∈ Supp(µ0), the set P̂ (s],
~δ, s) contains
the path reduced to ρ = s. Then p′(s | s], ~δ) = p̂(s|s], ~δ).
In order to efficiently compute the transition function of some ~δ, one uses a topologic
sort of the unobservable states thanks to the convergence hypothesis, and then compute
the probability from observable states to reach first the unobservable states topologically
sorted and then the observable states. This allows for a polynomial time computation of the
transition function of ~δ. The building of M′ is thus polynomial in number of states and of
the probabilities except for Act′ which is polynomial in |Act| and exponential in |S|.
Correspondence between strategies. The construction above ensures that any path
ρ′ = s]~δ1s1 . . . ~δksk of M′ corresponds to the set of paths ρ of M containing the sequence
s1 . . . sk of observable states, with subpaths ρ1 ∈ P̂ (s], ~δ1, s1) and ρi ∈ P̂ (si−1, ~δi, si) for
1 < i ≤ k. All paths in the set have the same observation w = O(s1) . . .O(sk) with
O′(ρ′) = ]w.
To show that disclosure over finite horizon is the same in both MDP, we establish
correspondences between the strategies of M and M′ and the associated disclosure value.
From Proposition 10, we can restrict to observation-based strategies.
Let σ′ be an observation based strategy of M′, defined on ]Σ∗ × S′. Given an observation
w ∈ Σ∗ there exists ~δ such that for all state s ∈ S′, we have σ′(]w, s) = ~δ. We define for
s ∈ S σ(w, s) = ~δ(s). Conversely, given an observation-based strategy σ of M, we build
an observation based strategy σ′ of M′ as follows: Given w ∈ Σ∗, we define the mapping
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σ′(]w) : S → Act by σ′(]w)(s) = σ(w, s) for any s ∈ S.
Then, writing Pσ (resp. Pσ′) instead of PMσ(µ0) (resp. PM′σ′ (µ′0)), and defining for w ∈ Σ
∗
and s ∈ S \O−1(ε), R(w, s) = {ρ ∈ FPath(Mσ(µ0)) | O(ρ) = w ∧ last(ρ) = s} and R′(w, s) =
{ρ′ ∈ FPath(M′σ′(µ′0)) | O(ρ′) = ]w ∧ last(ρ′) = s}, we have Pσ(R(w, s)) = Pσ′(R′(w, s)).
Therefore, by choosing as set of secret state of S′, Sec′ = Sec ∩ S′ and as the set of secret
state is absorbing, the disclosures over finite horizon are equal for σ and σ′.
J
B Maximisation
I Proposition 12 (Dominance of deterministic strategies). Given an MDP, a secret and an
observation-based strategy σ there exists a deterministic observation-based strategy σ′ with
greater or equal disclosure of the secret.
Proof. In the proof of Lemma 1 of [10], the authors show that a randomised observation based
strategy can be seen as an average over a family of deterministic observation based strategy.
As a consequence of their equation (2), in our framework, given an observation based strategy
σ and a disclosure notion disc, there exists an observation based deterministic strategy
σdet such that for all ρ ∈ FPath, Supp(σdet(ρ)) ⊆ Supp(σ(ρ)) and PMσdet (µ0)(Vσ(µ0)) ≥
PMσ(µ0)(Vσ(µ0)).
The first property implies that Vσ(µ0)∩Path(Mσdet(µ0)) ⊆ Vσdet(µ0). Indeed, as σ allows
more possibilities than σdet, Path(Mσdet(µ0)) ⊆ Path(Mσ(µ0)). This implies that given a
path ρ, if O(ρ) discloses the secret with the strategy σ then either O(ρ) discloses the secret
with the strategy σdet or O(ρ) cannot be observed with σdet. Hence the result.
This implies:
PMσdet (µ0)(Vσ(µ0)) = PMσdet (µ0)(Vσ(µ0) ∩ Path(Mσdet(µ0))) ≤ PMσdet (µ0)(Vσdet(µ0))
Therefore,
disc(Mσdet(µ0)) = PMσdet (µ0)(Vσdet(µ0)) ≥ PMσdet (µ0)(Vσ(µ0)) ≥ PMσ(µ0)(Vσ(µ0)) and
the result holds since PMσ(µ0)(Vσ(µ0)) = disc(Mσ(µ0)).
J
I Theorem 13 (Undecidability of maximal finite horizon disclosure). The maximal finite horizon
disclosure problem is undecidable for MDPs, even when the secret is reached with probability
1 and for a non-erasing observation function.
The maximal finite horizon disclosure problem when restricted to finite-memory strategies is
also undecidable (with the same additional assumptions).
Proof. Recall that we prove the result for (more compact) IMCs since it carries over to
MDPs.
For an IMC M = (S, sinit, I,O), we abuse notations by writing µ ∈ I(s) to denote any
distribution µ : S → [0, 1] such that for all s′ ∈ S, µ(s′) ∈ I(s′ | s). The notion of path
ρ is the same as for a Markov chain but a transition from s = last(ρ) to some successor
requires the choice of a distribution µ ∈ I(s). A strategy of IMC M is thus a mapping
σ : FPath(M)→ Dist(S) such that for each path ρ with s = last(ρ), σ(ρ) ∈ I(s).
We first give the construction. The preliminary step is very similar to what was done
in the proof of Theorem 3. Starting from a PA A = (Q, q0, {a, b}, T, F ) that is supposed
complete, we build an IMC Â where {a, b} is the observation alphabet: The set of states is
Q̂ = Q∪{qc | q ∈ Q∧ c ∈ {a, b}}, with initial state q0. The observation function Ô is defined
by Ô(q) = ε and Ô(qc) = c for q ∈ Q and c ∈ {a, b}. The interval mapping Î : Q̂ → IQ̂ is
defined for q, q′ ∈ Q and c ∈ {a, b} by:
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Î(q′ | qc) = T (q′ | q, c) is a point interval;
Î(qc | q) = [0, 1].
Compared to the illustration given in Figure 3, this construction amounts to replacing all [
by ε (making the states non observable) and the probabilities 14 from original states to new
ones by the interval [0, 1].
ε
s0
εs1 a
sa
b
sb
]
s]
]
r]
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ra
b
rb
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εq ]
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1
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Figure 5 Reduction from the strict emptiness problem to the disclosure problem. An edge
outgoing from a dotted box should be duplicated to originate from all states in the box and an edge
entering a dotted box from a state s should be duplicated from s to any state in the box. Hence a
loop on a dotted box means a complete graph inside the box (including self-loops).
However, the construction of the complete IMC MA = (S, s0, I,O) from A is more involved
and requires to add an upper gadget limiting the power of the strategy. This is why we first
use an observation function which can erase states and explain at the end how to lift this
hypothesis. The construction is illustrated in Figure 5 with some conventions to avoid too
many edges, a final state from A (like qf ) is doubly circled.
S = {s0, s1, q1] , q2] , q[, qs} ∪ Q̂ ∪ {sc | c ∈ {a, b, ]}} ∪ {rc | c ∈ {a, b, ], [}};
I(s1 | s0) = I(q0 | s0) = 12 and the restriction of I to Q̂ is Î. For all c ∈ {1, a, b, ]},
c′ ∈ {a, b, ]}, I(sc′ | sc) = 16 and I(rc′ | sc) = [0,
1
4 ], for all c, c
′ ∈ {a, b, ], [}, I(rc′ | rc) = 15
and I(qs | rc) = 15 . For all q ∈ Q \ F , I(q
1
] | q) = [0, 1], for all q ∈ F , I(q2] | q) = [0, 1],
and I(qs | q1] ) = I(q[ | q2] ) = I(qs | q[) = I(qs | qs) = 1.
O extends Ô by: O(s0) = O(s1) = ε, O(q1] ) = O(q2] ) = O(qs) = ], O(q[) = [, for all
c ∈ {a, b, ], [},O(rc) = c, and for all c ∈ {a, b, ]},O(sc) = c.
Informally, for Sec = {qs}, the upper gadget ensures that for any strategy σ there is at
most one word w ∈ {a, b}∗ such that the observation w][] discloses the secret. The lower
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gadget allows to generate secret paths of observation w][] with half the probability as the
one assigned by the PA to w.
We now formally prove that there exists a word w ∈ {a, b}∗ with PFA(w) > 12 if and only
if Discmax(MA) > 14 .
First suppose there exists a word w = a1 . . . an ∈ {a, b}∗ accepted with probability greater
than 12 in A. We define the strategy σ for a finite path ρ in both parts of MA (when relevant)
as follows:
In the upper part, assume that ρ ends in a state sc with c ∈ {1, a, b, ]}. If there exists
i < n such that O(ρ) = a1 . . . ai then σ(ρ)(rai+1) = 0, leaving no choice for the rest of the
distribution: In order for the sum of probabilities to be equal to 1 we have for b 6= ai+1,
σ(ρ)(rb) = 14 . If O(ρ) = w, then σ(ρ)(r]) = 0, which also leaves no choice for the rest of
the distribution.
In the bottom part, we can assume that ρ ends in a state q ∈ Q. If there exists i < n
such that O(ρ) = a1 . . . ai then σ(ρ)(qai+1) = 1. Finally, if O(ρ) = w then σ(ρ)(q2] ) = 1 if
q ∈ F , and σ(ρ)(q1] ) = 1 otherwise.
At the beginning the system will go with probability 12 to Â, where the strategy ensures
that the word w] is observed. This leads to the state q1] with probability 12P
F
A(w) and
thus the next observations belong to []∗ and the paths with observations in w][]+ belong
to the secret. On the other hand, the system can also go to s1 with probability 12 from
where w] cannot be observed because of the choices of the strategy. This implies that
w][] is a min-disclosing observation in MA,σ, hence Disc(MA,σ) ≥ 12P
F
A(w) > 14 . Since
Discmax(MA) = supσDisc(MA,σ), we can conclude that Discmax(MA) > 14 .
Conversely suppose that the disclosure is strictly greater than 14 and let σ be a strategy
such that Disc(MA,σ) > 14 . Then σ must forbid states in {rc | c ∈ {a, b, ]}}, otherwise there
would be no disclosing observation since every observation can be simulated once a state rc
is reached and followed by a [. Writing Σ = {a, b, ]}, we inductively define the word w ∈ Σ∞
by a sequence (wi)i≥0, such that wi ≤ wi+1 ≤ w for all i ≥ 0:
We start with w0 = ε;
Assume wi is built and let ρi be a path ending in state sx for some x ∈ {1, a, b, ]}, with
O(ρi) = wi. If σ(ρi)(rc) = 0 for some c ∈ {a, b, ]}, then wi+1 = wic, otherwise wi+1 = wi.
The set of ambiguous observations (i.e. corresponding to both secret and non-secret paths)
are those reaching the set of states {rc | c ∈ {a, b, ], [}}:⋃
wix 6= wi+1
x 6= [
wix(Σ ∪ {[})∗]ω.
Hence, the set of disclosing observations is reduced to either w][]ω, where w is the largest
prefix of w in {a, b}∗ if ] occurs in w, and empty otherwise. Since the disclosure is greater than
0, we obtain w][] as the single min-disclosing observation with Disc(MA,σ) = PMA,σ (w][]).
Since PFA(w) ≥ PMA,σ (w][]), we can conclude that PFA(w) > 12 .
The proof can be extended with a non-erasing observation function by replacing ε with a
fixed additional symbol (like in the proof of Theorem 3). This requires to slightly modify the
boxes with states {sc | c ∈ {a, b, ]}} and {rc | c ∈ {a, b, ]}} to ensure alternation of letters
from {a, b} and this new symbol.
The result on finite memory strategies holds as the strategy we build from the word of
the automaton in the first direction of the proof only uses finite memory.
J
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I Theorem 15 (Undecidability of maximal finite horizon limit-sure disclosure). The maximal
finite horizon limit-sure disclosure problem is undecidable for MDPs.
Proof. The proof is a reduction from the value 1 problem for PA. The construction of MA
depicted in Figure 5 for the proof of Theorem 13 is slightly modified as follows (see Figure 6):
a new state q\ with O(q\) = \ is added in the upper part just before reaching the secret state
qs. In this case, the paths reaching the secret in the upper part disclose the secret as they
end with \]ω. In the bottom part, the disclosure depends on val(A) and, similarly as above,
we can prove that Discmax(MA) = 1 if and only val(A) = 1, which yields the result. J
· · ·
· · ·
\
q\
]
qs
1
1
5
1
5
1
Figure 6 Modification of Figure 5 for limit disclosure.
I Theorem 16 (Decidability of maximal finite-horizon almost-sure disclosure). The maximal
finite-horizon almost-sure disclosure problem in MDPs is EXPTIME-complete. Moreover, if
the system is almost-surely disclosing, one can build a belief-based strategy with disclosure 1.
Proof. We reduce the almost-sure disclosure problem for maximisation in MDPs to the
almost-sure reachability of a partially observable MDP (POMDP). A POMDP is an MDP
where the strategies resolving the non determinism depend only on the observation sequence
and do not take the current state into account. The POMDP we build is exponential in the
size of the original MDP and the algorithm to solve almost-sure reachability is exponential
in the size of the POMDP [11]. This gives an EXPTIME algorithm as those two exponentials
do not stack.
Construction of the POMDP. We start from MDP M = (S,Act, p,O) with Act =
∪s∈SA(s), observation alphabet Σ, and a set of secret states Sec ⊆ S. Thanks to Proposi-
tion 11 we can suppose O to be non-erasing. We build a POMDP M′ = (S′,Act′, p′,O′) with
set of states S′ ⊆ S× 2S , and observation alphabet Σ. The observation function O′ is defined
by O′((s,B)) = O(s). The set of actions of M′ is Act′ = DR where DR is the set of vectors of
deterministic decision rules ~δ over S. The initial distribution µ′0 satisfy µ′0(s,B) = µ0(s) iff
B = O−1(s) ∩ Supp(µ0), and 0 otherwise. Given a state (s,B) ∈ S′, an action ~δ ∈ DR and
an observable state s′,
p′((s′, B′) | (s,B), ~δ) = p(s′|s, ~δ(s)) for B′ = {s′′ | O(s′′) = O(s′) ∧ ∃ŝ ∈ B, p(s′′|ŝ, ~δ(s)) > 0},
and 0 otherwise.
Correspondence between strategies. To show that M is almost-surely disclosing for
Sec iff Sec× 2Sec can almost-surely be reached in M′, we have to establish correspondences
between the strategies of M and M′. From Proposition 12, we can restrict to deterministic
observation-based strategies for M, and from [11], we also restrict to deterministic strategies
for M′.
Let σ′ be a strategy of M′, defined on Σ∗. Then σ is defined for any observation w ∈ Σ∗
and state s ∈ S by σ(w, s) = σ′(w)(s). Remark that a σ′-compatible path ρ′ of M′ ends
in a state (s,B) where B = Bσw (the belief w.r.t. σ) if O(ρ′) = w. Conversely, given an
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observation-based strategy σ of M, we build a strategy σ′ of M′ as follows: Given w ∈ Σ∗,
we define the mapping σ′(w) : S → Act by σ′(w)(s) = σ(w, s) for any s ∈ S.
Then, writing Pσ (resp. Pσ′) instead of PMσ(µ0) (resp. PM′σ′ (µ′0)), and defining R(w, s) =
{ρ ∈ FPath(Mσ(µ0)) | O(ρ) = w ∧ last(ρ) = s} and R′(w, s) = {ρ′ ∈ FPath(M′σ′(µ′0)) |
O(ρ′) = w ∧ last(ρ′) = (s,Bσw)}, we have Pσ(R(w, s)) = Pσ′(R′(w, s)).
Now let Reach(Sec× 2Sec) be the set of paths reaching Sec× 2Sec in M′σ′(µ′0). Then we
claim that Discmax(Mσ(µ0)) = Pσ′(Reach(Sec× 2Sec)). Indeed, an observation w discloses
the secret under strategy σ iff all observable states reachable with observation w belong to
the secret, i.e. iff Bσw ⊆ Sec. Thus the paths ρ′ in M′ with a disclosing observation are those
for which last(ρ′) ∈ Sec× 2Sec. Therefore the probability of reaching Sec× 2Sec in M′ under
strategy σ′ is also the probability of disclosing Sec in M under strategy σ.
We can conclude that M is almost-surely disclosing if and only if the paths of M′ reach
almost-surely the set of states Sec× 2Sec. Moreover, if M′ almost-surely reaches the set of
states Sec× 2Sec, we can build a strategy σ′ doing so. Using the transformation described
above, we extract from σ′ a belief-based strategy σ of M that almost-surely discloses the
secret.
Hardness is shown with a reduction from safety games with imperfect information.
IDefinition 24. A safety game with imperfect information is a tuple G = (L, `0,Σ,∆, O, F, obs)
where
L is a finite set of locations with initial location `0 ∈ L;
Σ is a finite alphabet;
∆ ⊆ L× Σ× L is the transition relation such that for all ` ∈ L and a ∈ Σ there exists at
least one `′ with (`, a, `′) ∈ ∆;
O is a finite set of observations, and F ⊆ O are the final observations;
obs : L→ O is the observation mapping.
A safety game with imperfect information G is a turn-based game played by two players
Control and Environment. It starts in location `0 with Control to play. In the first
round, Control chooses a letter a0 ∈ Σ, then Environment chooses a location `1 such that
(`0, a, `1) ∈ ∆ and Control only observes o1 = obs(`1). The next rounds are played similarly
and Control wins if for all i, oi 6∈ F .
The problem of existence of a winning strategy for Control is EXPTIME-complete [8]. We
now describe a reduction from this problem to the almost-sure disclosure problem of MDPs.
The reduction is similar to the proof of Theorem 13 except that we replace the probabilistic
automaton by a safety game G = (L, `0,Σ,∆, O, F, obs) with imperfect information and
directly build an MDP M = (S,Act, p,O) over alphabet (O∪{], [, \})∪Σ× (O∪{], [}), with:
S = {s0, `0, q1] , q2] , q[, q1s , q2s} ∪ {`c | ` ∈ L, c ∈ Σ × O} ∪ {sc | c ∈ Σ × (O ∪ {]})} ∪ {rc |
c ∈ Σ× (O ∪ {], [})};
Act = Σ;
For all a ∈ Σ, o ∈ O, `c ∈ S, `′ ∈ obs−1(o), p(`′a,o | `c, a) > 0 iff (`, a, `′) ∈ ∆.
If ` ∈ obs−1(F ) then p(q1] | `c, a) > 0 and if ` 6∈ obs−1(F ) then p(q2] | `c, a) > 0.
For all a ∈ Σ, c ∈ {0} ∪ (Σ× (O ∪ {]})), (b′, o′) ∈ Σ× (O ∪ {]}), p(s(b′,o′) | sc, a) > 0 and
if b′ 6= a, p(r(b′,o′) | sc, a) > 0.
For all c, c′ ∈ Σ × (O ∪ {]}), p(rc′ | rc, a) > 0 and p(q2s | rc, a) > 0. For all a, a′ ∈ Σ,
p(q1s | q1] , a) = p(q[ | q2] , a) = p(q1s | q[, a) = p(q1s | q1s , a) = p(q2s | q2s , a) = 1.
O(s0) = O(`0) = obs(`0); For z ∈ L, s, r, a ∈ Σ, o ∈ O, O(za,o) = (a, o); For o ∈ {], [},
O(za,o) = o, and O(q1] ) = O(q2] ) = ] = O(q1s), O(q[) = [, O(q2s) = \.
B. Bérard and S. Haddad and E. Lefaucheux XX:23
The initial distribution is µ0(s0) = 1/2 = µ0(`0) and the secret is Sec = {q1s , q2s}.
This proof being similar to the one of Theorem 13, we only detail here the differences. A
path starting in s0 will almost surely trigger a \ and disclose the secret. A path starting in `0
will almost surely reach q1s as after any action in the copy of G there is a positive probability
to reach q1] or q2] . In order for a finite path starting in `0 to disclose the secret, it can not go
through q1] and should not have the same observation as the one of a path ending in a state
rc. Given a strategy σ of M, if there exists a σ-compatible path ρ visiting a state `c with an
observation O(`c) ∈ Σ×F , then there is a σ-compatible path ρ′ visiting q1] , therefore a set of
paths with positive probability do not visit the secret. Thus a deterministic strategy almost
surely disclosing the secret in M never visits a state triggering an observation of the form
Σ× F . Moreover such a strategy does not take the current state into account. Indeed, let ρ
and ρ′ be two paths such that O(ρ) = O(ρ′) and ending in two states `c and sc. If σ(ρ) = a
and σ(ρ′) = a′ are two actions in Σ with a 6= a′ then there exists o ∈ O such that ρa`a,o is a
σ-compatible path. Since a 6= a′, ρ′ara,o is also a σ-compatible path with same observation
than ρa`a,o. Hence no observation prefixed by O(ρa`a,o) would disclose the secret.
Therefore, similarly as in Theorem 13, Control has a winning strategy iff there exists
a deterministic strategy considering only the sequence of observation that almost-surely
discloses the secret. This implies EXPTIME-hardness.
J
C Minimisation
I Proposition 19. The minimal disclosure value for Sec in M(µ0) is equal to the minimal
probability to reach Avoid(Sec) in Mmin(µmin). Furthermore it is asymptotically reached by a
family of belief-based almost deterministic strategies.
Proof. We know that the minimal reachability probability for Avoid(Sec) in Mmin(µmin) is
obtained by a memoryless deterministic strategy σmin that selects some as,B in state (s,B).
Consider {σε} the family of belief-based almost-deterministic strategies defined by favouring
as,B in state s after a path ρ such that Bσερ = B. Given a path ρ = s0a0 . . . an−1sn in
M(µ0) we inductively define the path b(ρ) = (s0, S0)a0 . . . an−1(sn, Sn) in Mmin(µmin) by:
S0 = Supp(µ0) ∩ O−1(O(s0)) and Si+1 = NextMax(Si,O(si+1)). Due to the observation
given when introducing NextMax, with strategy σε, the observation of path ρ discloses the
secret iff b(ρ) reaches Avoid(Sec). Consider under strategy σε the probability to disclose
the secret with paths ρ such that b(ρ) includes at least once an action not selected by σmin.
By construction, at each step i, the probability of not choosing the action favoured by σε
is ε2i , hence the probability of those paths is
∑
i≥0(1 − ε)i
ε
2i ≤ 2ε. Consider now a path
s0a0 . . . an−1sn such that b(ρ) is σmin-compatible. Then the probability of the original path is
less than or equal to the probability of its corresponding path. So we deduce that the minimal
disclosure value of M(µ0) is bounded above by ν + 2ε where ν is the minimal reachability
probability for Avoid(Sec) in Mmin(µmin). Since this holds for all ε > 0, we obtain that the
minimal disclosure value of M(µ0) is bounded above by the minimal reachability probability
for Avoid(Sec) in Mmin(µmin).
Conversely consider an arbitrary strategy σ in M(µ0). This strategy may be also applied in
Mmin(µmin) by forgetting the second component of the state, defining a strategy σ′. For any
path s0 . . . sn in Mσ(µ0), there is a single path (s0, S0)a0 . . . (sn, Sn) in Mmin(µmin) under
σ′ with the same probability. Given the path s0a0 . . . sn, consider the successive associated
subsets of beliefs according to σ, B0, . . . , Bn. By induction (and definition of Mmin) it is
straightforward to show that Bi ⊆ Si. So s0a0 . . . sn does not disclose the secret in M under σ
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implies that (s0, S0) . . . (sn, Sn) does not reach Avoid(Sec). This entails that the reachability
probability of Avoid(Sec) in Mmin(µmin) under σ′ is less than or equal to the disclosure
probability in M(µ0) under σ. J
D Fixed horizon
I Theorem 22 (Computation of the maximal disclosure value within fixed-horizon). The fixed-
horizon maximal value (when the horizon n is described in unary representation) is computable
in PSPACE and the fixed-horizon maximal disclosure problem is PSPACE-complete.
Value and membership. We first present a non deterministic procedure that decides in
PSPACE the disclosure problem. It can then be determinised using Savitch’s Theorem.
From an arbitrarily ordered observation alphabet Σ, the procedure operates as follows for
horizon n:
It maintains a disclosure value v, a sequence of observations o0 · · · oi with i ≤ n, a
sequence of sets of states B1 · · ·Bi with Bj ⊆ O−1(oj) for all j ≤ i, an action aj,s ∈ A(s)
for all (j, s) with j < i and s ∈ Sj , and for all (j, s) with j ≤ i and s ∈ Bj the probability
pj,s to reach s after the sequence of observations o0 · · · oi;
Initially v = 0, o0 is the smallest observation in O(Supp(µ0)), where µ0 is the initial
distribution, B0 = Supp(µ0) ∩ O−1(o0) and p0,s = µ0(s) for s ∈ B0;
If i < n then for all s ∈ Bi, the procedure guesses an action ai,s ∈ A(s). Let oi+1 be the
smallest observation such that there exists a state s ∈ Bi and a state s′ ∈ O−1(oi+1) with
p(s′|s, ai,s) > 0. Then Bi+1 is set to {s′ ∈ O−1(oi+1) | ∃s ∈ Bi p(s′|s, ai,s) > 0} and for
all s′ ∈ Bi+1, pi+1,s′ =
∑
s∈Bi pi,sp(s
′|s, ai,s);
If i = n, the procedure examines Bn. If Bn ⊆ Sec then v = v +
∑
s∈Bn pn,s otherwise
v is unchanged. Afterwards it “backtracks” to the greatest 0 < i ≤ n such that there
exists o′i > oi with some s ∈ Bi−1 and a state s′ ∈ O−1(o′i) with p(s′|s, ai−1,s) > 0. Then
Bi and the pi,s′ ’s are updated accordingly and the procedure carries on. If there is no
such i, the procedure returns to i = 0 and similarly looks for some o′0 > o0, where the
initialization step is again performed except for the value of v which is unchanged. When
the maximal observation in Σ ∩ O(Supp(µ0)) is handled, the procedure terminates by
comparing v to the threshold.
The correctness of the procedure follows from the fact that there exists an optimal determ-
inistic strategy where the selection of the action for the current state depends only on the
sequence of observations (and not on the sequence of visited states).
The space complexity of the procedure is in O(n|S|(log(|A|) + nb)) where b is the maximal
number of bits used to represent a transition probability of the MDP.
Observe now that since the maximal value is obtained by a deterministic strategy, one knows
a denominator of this value: dn where d is the lcm of the denominators for probabilities
occuring in the model. Its bit size is polynomial w.r.t. the size of the model. So by iteratively
solving the disclosure problem for idn for increasing values of i, one computes the maximal
value in PSPACE.
J
Hardness. We reduce the truth of a quantified boolean formula: Given a closed QBF in
3CNF φ = ∃x1∀y1∃x2 . . . ∀ynψ with ψ =
∧
i=1...m(zi1 ∨ zi2 ∨ zi3), we build an MDP M such
that φ is true if and only if Disc2(n+m)+3,max(M) ≥ 122n .
The MDP M = (S,Act, p,O) (depicted in Figure 7 with some conventions to avoid having
too many edges) is defined by:
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Figure 7 Reduction of the satisfiability problem to the disclosure on a fixed horizon. The box
Sx1 is represented in Figure 8.
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Figure 8 Representation of the box Sx1 . We use the convention of Figure 5.
S = {sinit, send, s]} ∪ {szi | z ∈ {x, y}, i = 1 . . . n} ∪ {s¬zi | z ∈ {x, y}, i = 1 . . . n} ∪ {sit |
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}} ∪ {szij | i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}} ∪i∈{1,...n} (Sxi ∪ Syi ∪ S¬xi ∪ S¬yi)
where for zi one of the boolean variable, Szi = {szi,1a | a ∈ {], zi,¬zi | z ∈ {x, y}, i ∈
{1, . . . , n}}} ∪ {szi,2a | a ∈ {], [, zi,¬zi | z ∈ {x, y}, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}}. Similar for the box
S¬zi of the negation of a variable.
A(sinit) = {x1,¬x1}, and for all i < n, A(syi) = A(s¬yi) = {xi+1,¬xi+1}.
For i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, A(sit) = {1, 2, 3} and A(s) = {next} for all other states (even in
boxes).
p(sa | sinit, a) = p(sa,1a | sinit, a) = 1/2. For all i < n, p(sa | syi , a) = p(sa,1a | syi , a) =
p(sa | s¬yi , a) = p(sa,1a | s¬yi , a) = 1/2. For all i ≤ n,
p(syi | sxi , next) = p(syi,1yi | sxi , next) = p(s¬yi | sxi , next) = p(s
¬yi,1
¬yi | sxi , next) =
p(syi | ¬sxi , next) = p(syi,1yi | s¬xi , next) = p(s¬yi | s¬xi , next) = p(s
¬yi,1
¬yi | s¬xi , next) =
1/4, and p(s1t | s], next) = 1. For all i = 1 . . .m, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, p(s
zij | sit, j) = 1, and if
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i < m, p(si+1t | s
zij , next) = 1. Finally, p(send | szmj , next) = p(send | send, next) = 1.
We now describe p for the box Sx1 other boxes being similar. For all a, b ∈ {], x1, zi,¬zi |
z ∈ {x, y}, i ∈ {2, . . . , n}}, p(sx1,1b | sx1,1a , next) = p(sx1,2¬x1 | s
x1,1
a , next) = 1/(4n+ 1) and
for all c, d ∈ {], [, zi,¬zi | z ∈ {x, y}, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}, p(sx1,2d | sx1,2c , next) = 1/(4n+ 2).
O(send) = [,O(sba) = a and O(sa) = a when a is a boolean variable or its negation and
for all other state s, O(s) = ].
The initial distribution µ0 is 1sinit and the set of secret paths SPath contains those reaching
send.
We show that φ is true iff the disclosure of M for observations of length 2(n + m) + 3
is greater than or equal to 122n . First remark that for any strategy, the measure of paths
reaching state send with observation of length 2(n+m) + 3 is exactly 122n . Indeed, during
each of the first 2n actions, whatever the choices of the strategy, there is a probability 12 to
go in one of the boxes and 12 to continue advancing, thus a probability
1
22n to reach the state
s]. From there every path reaches send in 2(m+ 1) steps. If the strategy is such that some
variable and its negation are read on the way to send, then there exists a path with same
observation reaching the second part of a box where every observation can be triggered, and
thus the path reaching send will not disclose the secret.
Intuitively, during the first 2n steps, every boolean variable will be assigned a value:
either chosen by the strategy as it chooses whether xi or ¬xi occurs in the observation for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n, or randomly as yi and ¬yi both have half chance of being triggered. During the
last 2m steps, the strategy must trigger a boolean formula in every clause of the disjunction
so that if a clause is not satisfied by the current assignement, then a boolean variable will be
observed as both true and false during the path. Thus the observation would not disclose the
secret. In order for a measure of 122n of paths to disclose the secret, for every assignement of
the yi the controller must force the path reaching send to disclose the secret.
Suppose that φ is equivalent to true. Thus there exist functions (fi)i=1...n (express-
ing the choices for x1, . . . , xn) such that for every set of assignements (a1, . . . , an) of the
variables y1, . . . , yn the boolean formula ψ[f1(), a1, f2(a1), . . . , fn(a1, . . . , an−1), an] is true.
We choose a strategy σ such that for every possible set of assignements (a1, . . . , an) for
the variables y1, . . . , yn, for all i ∈ {0, . . . n − 1}, σ(]f1()a1f2(a1) . . . ai) = fi+1(a1, . . . , ai).
Moreover for i1, . . . , ik ∈ {1, 2, 3}, there exists zk+1ik+1 ∈ {f1(), a1, f2(a1), . . . , an} such that
σ(]f1()a1f2(a1) . . . an]]z1i1 z2i2 . . . zkik ) = zk+1ik+1 . The choice of the strategy is arbitrary in
the other cases. Such a strategy can be defined since ψ[f1(), a1, f2(a1), . . . , fn(a1, . . . , an−1), an]
is true and thus every clause is satisfied by this choice of assignements.
With this strategy, the fixed horizon disclosure in 2(n + m + 1) steps is 122n . In other
words, all the paths reaching the secret disclose it. Indeed let ρ be a secret path of
length 2(n + m + 1). There exists an assignment a1, . . . , an ∈ {y1,¬y1, . . . yn,¬yn} such
that O(ρ) = ]f1()a1f2(a1) . . . an]]z1i1 z2i2 . . . zmim [. By choice of σ, if, for z ∈ {x, y} and
i ∈ {1, . . . n}, zi appears in the observation of ρ, ¬zi does not appear, and vice versa.
Therefore as [ can be read either in send or in a state reachable only by paths observing a
boolean variable and its negation, ρ discloses the secret.
Conversely, suppose that φ is not equivalent to true and let σ be a strategy, which
can be assumed to be deterministic thanks to Proposition 12. We build partial functions
fi : Σ2i 7→ Act consistent with σ: for every observation ]w ∈ ]Σ2i of some path ρ, if σ chooses
action a ∈ A(last(ρ)) for ρ (i.e., σ(ρ)(a) = 1) then fi(w) = a. As φ is not equivalent to true,
there exists an assignement (a1, . . . , an) for the variables y1, . . . , yn such that the boolean
formula ψ[f1(), a1, f2(a1), . . . , fn(a1, . . . , an−1), an] is false. We now build a path with non
null probability, reaching the secret but not disclosing it.
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By construction, there exists ρ such that O(ρ) = ]f1()a1f2(a1) . . . fn(a1 . . . an−1)an], with
last(ρ) = s] and Pσ(ρ) > 0 (where again Pσ stands for PMσ(µ0)). Let i ∈ N be an integer such
that zi1 ∨ zi2 ∨ zi3 is not true under the assignment [f1(), a1, f2(a1), . . . , fn(a1, . . . , an−1), an],
in other words such that the negations of zi1 , zi2 and zi3 were chosen as assignement. Let ρ′
be the path of length 2(n+m) + 2 extending ρ and ending in send. Then ρ′ does not disclose
the secret: indeed, there exists j ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that zij appears in its last 2m observations
while its negation (written ¬zij here) appears in the first 2n+ 1 observations. Thus there
exists a path with same observation leading to the second part of the box S¬zij which is
outside the secret and where every observation is possible. As the total measure of paths
reaching the secret is 122n and at least a subset of measure Pσ(ρ) of the paths reaching the
secret do not disclose it, the disclosure of M is strictly smaller than 122n in 2(n + m) + 3
observation steps. J
To prove Theorem 23, we need the following lemma where disc∗h stands for (Disch)min:
I Lemma 25. Let h be a fixed horizon. Let µ be a distribution with support B ⊆ O−1(o) for
some observation o. Then disc∗h(M(µ)) =
∑
s∈Supp(µ) µ(s)disc∗h(M(s, Supp(µ))) and there
exists a family of almost deterministic strategies that asymptotically reaches this value.
Proof. The proof is done by induction on the horizon length h with some arbitrary initial
distribution µ with support B ⊆ O−1(o) for some o:
disc∗h+1(M(µ))
= inf
~δ
disc∗h(M(NextDist(µ,~δ)))
= inf
~δ
∑
o∈Σ
NextDist(µ,~δ)(o)disc∗h(M(NextDist(µ,~δ)o))
= inf
~δ
∑
o∈Σ
∑
s∈O−1(o)
NextDist(µ,~δ)(s)disc∗h(M(s, Supp(NextDist(µ,~δ)o)))
(applying the induction hypothesis)
≥ inf
~δ
∑
o∈Σ
∑
s∈O−1(o)
NextDist(µ,~δ)(s)disc∗h(M(s,NextMax(B, o)))
(since enlarging the belief decreases disclosure)
= inf
~δ
∑
o∈Σ
∑
s∈O−1(o)
∑
ŝ∈B
µ(ŝ)p(s|ŝ, ~δ[ŝ])disc∗h(M(s,NextMax(B, o)))
= inf
~δ
∑
o∈Σ
∑
s∈O−1(o)
∑
ŝ∈B
∑
a∈A(ŝ)
µ(ŝ)~δ[ŝ](a)p(s|ŝ, a)disc∗h(M(s,NextMax(B, o)))
(applying the definition of NextDist and summing over the possible actions).
Observe now that we have a linear expression over the unknowns {~δ[ŝ](a)}. So the last
infimum is obtained for some ~δ such that there exists a family of {aŝ} with ~δ[ŝ] = 1aŝ for
each ŝ ∈ B. We denote this value by I(M, µ, h)(~δ) and consider ~δε defined by ~δε[s] = ~δ[s]ε.
Then:
I(M, µ, h)(~δ) ≤ disc∗h+1(M(µ)) ≤ I(M, µ, h)(~δε) ≤ I(M, µ, h)(~δ) + ε
Thus we establish the induction by selecting initially the family of decision rules {~δε}ε which
asymptotically leads to the optimal choice. In addition the optimal value can be rewritten as:
I(M, µ, h)(~δ) =
∑
o∈Σ
∑
s∈O−1(o)
∑
ŝ∈B µ(ŝ)p(s|ŝ, aŝ)disc∗h(M(s,NextMax(B, o)))
=
∑
ŝ∈B µ(ŝ)
∑
o∈Σ
∑
s∈O−1(o) p(s|ŝ, aŝ)disc∗h(M(s,NextMax(B, o)))
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where
∑
o∈Σ
∑
s∈O−1(o) p(s|ŝ, aŝ)disc∗h(M(s,NextMax(B, o))) can be shown by a similar reas-
oning to be equal to disc∗h+1(M(ŝ, B)). J
I Theorem 23 (Minimal disclosure within fixed horizon). The fixed horizon minimal value is
computable in PSPACE. The fixed horizon minimal disclosure problem is PSPACE-complete.
In addition, the strategy decision problem is also decidable in PSPACE.
Proof. The procedures for the first two problems are very similar to the ones used in
Theorem 22. There are only two differences. First given Bi the current belief and oi+1 one
computes Bi+1 = NextMax(Bi, oi+1) (independently of the guessed actions ai,s). Second the
computation procedure operates by decreasing values of i when the value is less or equal
than idn .
In order to decide whether a strategy exists that provides the minimal value, one guesses this
strategy in PSPACE as before. However there is an additional difficulty since the (possible)
optimal strategy may be randomised. Thus during the procedure, given some belief B and
some state s, one guesses the support A′ ⊆ As of the decision rule and one defines the
decision rule say δ as a uniform choice over A′. We claim that this restriction is sound.
Assume another decision rule δ′ with same support would provide a smaller value then since
the support are unchanged the decision rule unformally described as (1 + ε)δ′ − εδ for small
enough ε would still provide a better value meaning that the support A′ cannot be used to
find an optimal strategy.
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Figure 9 Reduction of the satisfiability problem to the disclosure on a fixed horizon. The box
Sx1 is represented in Figure 10
Like for the case of maximisation, the hardness of the fixed-horizon minimal disclosure
problem is obtained by a reduction from the truth of a quantified boolean formula. Let
φ = ∃x1∀y1∃x2 . . . ∀ynψ with ψ =
∧
i=1...m(zi1 ∨zi2 ∨zi3) a closed QBF where assume w.l.o.g.
that the litterals of any clause are distinct. We build the MDP M = (S,Act, p,O) (represented
in Figure 9) where:
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Figure 10 Representation of the box Sx1 (with the conventions of Figure 5).
S = {sinit, send, s]} ∪ {szi | z ∈ {x, y}, i = 1 . . . n} ∪ {s¬zi | z ∈ {x, y}, i = 1 . . . n} ∪
{sit | i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}} ∪ {s
zij | i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}} ∪ {sziend | z ∈ {x, y}, i =
1 . . . n} ∪i∈{1,...n} (Sxi ∪ Syi ∪ S¬xi ∪ S¬yi) where for zi one of the boolean variable,
Szi = {szia | a ∈ {], zi,¬zi | z ∈ {x, y}, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}} ∪ {s
zi
[ , s
zi
f }. Similar for the box
S¬zi of the negation of a variable.
A(sinit) = {x1,¬x1}, and for all i < n, A(syi) = A(s¬yi) = {xi+1,¬xi+1}. For i ∈
{1, . . . ,m}, A(sit) = {1, 2, 3} and for every other state (even in boxes), A(s) = {next}.
p(sa | sinit, a) = p(sa,1a | sinit, a) = 1/2. For all i < n, p(sa | syi , a) = p(sa,1a | syi , a) =
p(sa | s¬yi , a) = p(sa,1a | s¬yi , a) = 1/2. For all i ≤ n,
p(syi | sxi , next) = p(syi,1yi | sxi , next) = p(s¬yi | sxi , next) = p(s
¬yi,1
¬yi | sxi , next) =
p(ssyi |¬xi , yi) = p(s
yi,1
yi | s¬xi , yi) = p(s¬yi | s¬xi , next) = p(s
¬yi,1
¬yi | s¬xi , next) = 1/4.
p(s1t | s], next) = 1. For all i = 1 . . .m, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, p(s
zij | sit, j) = 1, and if i < m,
p(si+1t | s
zij , next) = 1. Finally p(send | szmj , next) = 1, and for all z ∈ {x, y}, i = 1 . . . n,
p(sziend | send, next) = 1/(2n).
We now describe p for the box Sx1 other boxes being similar. For all a ∈ {], x1, zi,¬zi | z ∈
{x, y}, i ∈ {2, . . . , n}}, b ∈ {], [, zi,¬zi | z ∈ {x, y}, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}} p(sx1b | sx1a , next) =
1/(4n+ 2), and p(sx1¬x1 | s
x1
¬x1 , next) = p(s
x1
f | s
x1
[ , next) = p(s
x1
f | s
x1
f , next) = 1.
O(send) = [, O(sba) = a and O(sa) = a when a is a boolean variable, its negation or [. For
i = 1 . . . n, O(sxiend) = O(s
xi
f ) = O(s
¬xi
f ) = 2i− 1 and O(s
yi
end) = O(s
yi
f ) = O(s
¬yi
f ) = 2i,
and for any other state s, O(s) = ].
The initial distribution µ0 is 1sinit and the secret paths are those visiting send (Sec =
{send} ∪ {sziend | z ∈ {x, y}, i = 1 . . . n}).
In a similar fashion as what was done in the hardness part of the proof of Proposition 22,
we show that φ is true iff the disclosure of M is equal to 0 in 2(n+m+ 2) steps. First remark
that a path ρ reaching send can be extended for all j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n} in a path ρj such that
O(ρj) = O(ρ)j. Moreover, ρ1 discloses the secret iff x1 and ¬x1 both occur in O(ρ1) (and
similarly for the other ρjs). Indeed a path reaching Sx1 or S¬x1 cannot have triggered both
observations x1 and ¬x1 and also end with observation 1.
Intuitively, during the first 2n steps, all boolean variables will be assigned a value: either
chosen by the strategy as it chooses whether xi or ¬xi occurs in the observation for each
1 ≤ i ≤ n, or randomly as yi and ¬yi both have half a chance of being triggered. During the
last 2m+ 1 steps, the strategy must choose a boolean formula in every clause so that if a
clause is not satisfied by the current assignement, then a boolean variable will be observed
as both true and false during the path. The last step triggers then randomly the observation
j for j ∈ {1, . . . 2n}.
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Suppose that φ is equivalent to true. Then there exist functions (fi)i=1...n such that
for every set of assignements (a1, . . . , an) for the variables y1, . . . , yn the boolean for-
mula ψ[f1(), a1, f2(a1), . . . , fn(a1, . . . , an−1), an)] is true. We choose a strategy σ such
that for every possible set of assignements (a1, . . . , an) for the variables y1, . . . , yn, and
for all i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, σ(]f1()a1f2(a1) . . . ai) = fi+1(a1, . . . , ai). Moreover for k ∈
{1, . . . ,m} and i1, . . . , ik ∈ {1, 2, 3}, there exists zk+1ik+1 ∈ {f1(), a1, f2(a1), . . . , an} such
that σ(]f1()a1f2(a1) . . . an]]z1i1 z2i2 . . . zkik ) = zk+1ik+1 . The choice of the strategy is ar-
bitrary in the other cases. Since ψ[f1(), a1, f2(a1), . . . , fn(a1, . . . , an−1), an)] is true, every
clause is satisfied by this choice of assignements, hence it is possible to define such a strategy.
With this strategy, the fixed horizon disclosure in 2(n+m+ 2) steps is 0. In other words,
none of the paths reaching the secret discloses it. Indeed let ρ be a secret path of length
2(n + m + 2), then there exist a1, . . . , an ∈ {y1,¬y1, . . . yn,¬yn} and j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n} such
that O(ρ) = ]f1()a1f2(a1) . . . an]]z1i1 z2i2 . . . zmim [j. By choice of σ, if, for z ∈ {x, y} and
i ∈ {1, . . . n}, zi appears in the observation of ρ, ¬zi does not, and vice versa. Therefore
as [j can be read either from send or in a box state outside of the secret reachable only by
paths that do not observe a boolean variable and its opposite, ρ does not disclose the secret.
Conversely, suppose that φ is not equivalent to true and let σ be an arbitrary strategy.
We first build a deterministic strategy σ′ with smaller or equal disclosure. The first choice
concerns {x1,¬x1} and the next observation in a path corresponds to the choice. Consider σ1
(resp. σ′1) the strategy that selects x1 (resp. ¬x1) and then plays like σ. Due to the fact that
observations are distinct, the disclosure value w.r.t. σ is a convex combination of those of σ1
and σ′1. So one substitutes σ by the one with smaller or equal disclosure. A similar pattern
applies for every choice until reaching the horizon. Thus by iterating this transformation we
obtain a deterministic strategy. So we assume now that σ is deterministic. Since there is a
finite number of such strategies for fixed horizon, it only remains to prove that the disclosure
value under σ is positive. We build partial functions fi : Σ2i 7→ Act consistent with σ: for
every observation ]w ∈ ]Σ2i of some path ρ, if σ chooses action a ∈ A(last(ρ)) for ρ, then we
set fi(w) = a. As φ is not equivalent to true, there exists an assignements (a1, . . . , an) for the
variables y1, . . . , yn such that the boolean formula ψ[f1(), a1, f2(a1), . . . , fn(a1, . . . , an−1, an)]
is false.
We now build a path disclosing the secret. By construction, there exists ρ such that
O(ρ) = ]f1()a1f2(a1) . . . fn(a1 . . . an−1)an], leading to last(ρ) = s] with Pσ(ρ) > 0. Let
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that the negations of zi1 , zi2 and zi3 were chosen as assignment hence
zi1 ∨ zi2 ∨ zi3 is not true under the assignment [f1(), a1, f2(a1), . . . , fn(a1, . . . , an−1), an)].
Let ρ′ be a path of length 2(n+m) + 3 extending ρ and ending in send. Then ρ′ does not
disclose the secret because there exists j ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that zij appears in the previous 2m
observations while its negation (written ¬zij here) appears in the first 2n+ 1 observations.
Let ρ′′ of length 2(n+m+ 2) extending ρ′ by ending in s
zij
end. There is no other path with
the same observation and ρ′′ is a secret path, thus ρ′′ discloses the secret. Therefore the
disclosure of M is strictly greater than 0.
Observe that this reduction also works for finite horizon since no further disclosure may
occur after the firsr occurrence of a state in {sx1end, . . . , s
xn
end, s
y1
end, . . . , s
yn
end}. J
